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Lenz v. Universal: A Call to Reform
Section 512(f) of the DMCA and to
Strengthen Fair Use
Marc J. Randazza*
ABSTRACT

Under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA), those who issue materially false takedown notices are
liable for damages. However, Section 512(f) has not effectively
protected fair use. Currently, the DMCA issuer only has to prove he
considered fair use before issuing a takedown notice, but faces no
liability for actually taking action againstfair use.
The outcome of the recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case
Lenz v. Universal shows the flaws in the language of the DMCA. This
Article calls for a mild adjustment to Section 512(f) for the purpose of
protectingfair use and free expression rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2007, Stephanie Lenz made a jerky and out-of-focus video of
her children running around her kitchen while they pushed toy baby
strollers. A few seconds of Prince's "Let's Go Crazy" incidentally
played in the background. 1 Ms. Lenz posted the video to YouTube.com
to very little fanfare or concern, presumably assuming that her family,
friends, and fans of cute kids would want to view it. If she lived under
a sane copyright regime, that would have been the end of the story.
However, an assistant from Universal Music Corporation's (UMC)
legal department found the video, decided that it infringed on UMC's
copyright in the song, and sent YouTube a takedown notice pursuant
2
to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
Prince Roger Nelson ("Prince"), known for zealously protecting
his works, publicly proclaimed that this was part of his efforts "to
reclaim his art on the internet. ' 3 His melodrama was not so ludicrous
in context. Perhaps a short video with a few bars from one song is no
1.
The video can be found at Stephanie Lenz, "Let's Go Crazy" #1, YOUTUBE (Feb. 7,
2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NlKfJHFWlhQ [https://perma.cc/ES55-NRUT].
2.
Decl. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at Ex. C, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 573
F.Supp.2d 1150 (N.D. Cal., 2008) (No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF). 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012) is part of the
codification of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 203, 112
Stat. 2860, 2877-86 (1998).
3.
See Order Den. Mot. to Dismiss, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 573 F.Supp.2d 1150
(N.D. Cal., 2008) (No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF); M. Collet-White, Prince to Sue YouTube, eBay Over
Music Use, REUTERS (Sept. 13, 2007, 9:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/09/14/usprince-youtube-idUSL1364328420070914 [https://perma.cc/3DA3-9MSM] (citing a statement
released on Prince's behalf regarding the Lenz case in 2007). For more on the intellectual
property antics of Prince"/"The Artist Formerly Known as Prince"/'The Artist Formerly known
as 'The Artist Formerly Known As Prince,"' see Andre Carter, The People Formerly Known as
Fans, CITYPAGES

(Minneapolis) (June 23,

1999),

http://www.citypages.com/news/the-people-

formerly-known-as-fans-6710648 [https://perma.cc/K3E7-HVU9] (describing Prince's lawsuit of
multiple fansites for use of his unpronounceable symbol).
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real threat to Prince's fortune, but the aggregate effect of true online
piracy certainly has an impact on his ability to convert his creativity
into money. Prince might have gone a bit far with his statement, but
he would hardly be the first artist to aggressively pursue legal
4
protection against the unauthorized use of his works.
UMC's takedown notice led to a federal lawsuit. Lenz sued
under a rarely employed portion of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. Section
512(f), 5 which provides for a cause of action against issuers of
improper takedown requests. 6 The basis of the claim was that UMC
knew, or should have known, that her use of a short clip of the song
constituted "fair use." 7 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that copyright owners need not make the right call on fair use,
but they must at least take fair use into account before they use the
8
power of the DMCA takedown provision.
When we consider that the DMCA notice-and-takedown
provision can be used as a tool for censorship and that fair use is free
expression's safety valve in the copyright regime, this decision is
hardly a confidence-building holding. Copyright owners must consider
fair use, but if they do not make the right call, is there no
consequence? The Lenz decision demonstrates that the 1990s-era
DMCA might not be suited to today's Internet. Perhaps it is time to
update the statute-and strengthen fair use protections. 9
To fully understand the story and its implications, this Article
will briefly explain the DMCA takedown scheme, fair use protection,
and the history of the Lenz case. This Article will explain the practical
implications of Lenz for users, service providers, and copyright owners
See e.g. KEMBREW MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: OVERZEALOUS COPYRIGHT
4.
Bozos AND OTHER ENEMIES OF CREATIVITY 62-113 (2005) (discussing lawsuits for sampling

brought by artist including the Turtles, Roy Orbison, and the Clash and overzealous companies
like Sony and Time Warner when it had "rights" to "Happy Birthday"). Also, many artists show
their tight grip on copyright through exceedingly high rates for sample licensing. Id.
Am. Compl., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal., 2008)
5.
(No. C 07-03783-MEJ).
6.
17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012). A DMCA takedown notice is a notification to a company,
usually a web host or a search engine, that they are either hosting or linking to copyrightinfringing material. Itprovides them notice to remove the copyrighted works.
7.
Am. Compl., supra note 5.
8.
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF, 2016 WL 1056082, at *4-5
(9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2015).
9.
In past years, many critics of the DMCA have made this assertion concerning each
of its provisions. For example, Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 695, 697 (2011); Martin B. Robins, A Good Idea at the Time: Recent
Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 512(c) Safe HarborJurisprudenceAnalysis and Critique of
Current Applications and Implications, 15 TUL.J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2012); and Marketa

Trimble & Salil Mehra, Secondary Liability, ISP Immunity, and Incumbent Entrenchment, 62
AM. J. COMP. L. 685 (2014) critique the DMCA's inability to meet requirements of a rapidly
evolving Internet, thus hindering users, ISPs, owners, and others attempting to enter the field.

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 18:4:743

seeking to enforce their rights. Finally, this Article suggests updates
to the DMCA and 17 U.S.C. Section 107 (fair use) that could remedy
some of the DMCA's shortcomings for both copyright owners and
online service providers, and provide greater breathing room for
freedom of expression.
Specifically, this Article will focus on the legitimacy and
number of takedown notices under DMCA Section 512. Part II will
briefly discuss abuse of the DMCA, as well as DMCA
counter-notifications and problems facing copyright owners. Part III
will analyze fair use as a right or as an affirmative defense. Part IV
will give a brief history of Section 512(f), and Part V will discuss the
recent Lenz v. Universal case, otherwise known as the "Dancing Baby"
case. Finally, Part VI suggests a mild reform of Section 512(f) in light
of the Lenz case and proposes treating fair use as an affirmative right,
rather than an affirmative defense.
II. THE DMCA SECTION 512 NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN
In 1998, Congress passed the DMCA in an attempt to balance
intellectual property rights with the desire to promote the growth of
electronic commerce and new technology. 10 The DMCA includes a
provision, codified at 17 U.S.C. Section 512(c), that allows copyright
owners to demand the removal of content from the Internet, as long as
those owners give formal notice to the online service provider (OSP)
where the content is hosted.1 1 Once the service provider receives a
DMCA notice (commonly referred to as a "takedown notice"), the OSP
must remove or disable access to the material "expeditiously," 12 or face
liability. 13 Upon complying with the notice, OSPs maintain their
14
immunity from liability for infringement themselves.
If the individual who posted the content believes the content is
lawfully published, they can file a counter-notification, thus giving a
green light to restoring the content. Nevertheless, there is a question
as to whether the notice-and-takedown provisions infringe on free
expression by acting as a prior restraint on speech, as there is no
10.
S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
11.
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998 (1998), http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf [https://perma.cc/
XXB6-VY4D]. An OSP is a website that hosts content, provides email, e-shopping, e-banking,
news, or online search capability.
12.
The statute does not define "expeditiously," and the meaning of "expeditious" in the
context of the DMCA has not yet been determined by the courts. However, Black's Law
Dictionary defines "expeditious" as "performed with, or acting with, expedition; quick; speedy."
Expeditious, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
13.
17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(C)-(3).
14.
17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d).
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incentive for service providers to actually evaluate the legitimacy of
the takedown notices. 15 In many cases, OSPs have little reason to
even make users aware of the takedown or to inform them that a
counter-notice is an option. 16 The content simply comes down, which,
as discussed below, causes significant issues.
Under the notice-and-takedown procedure, copyright owners
only need to swear both that their content has been posted and that
its use is not authorized. This notice alone imposes a duty on the OSP
to remove the content from public view. It will then be removed (at
least in theory). At the time the DMCA passed, movie studios and
record companies endorsed the provision, as it allowed them to remedy
online piracy with little more than a form letter.1 7 At the time, the
DMCA appeared beneficial and necessary to copyright owners
attempting to enforce their rights on a new platform.18 However, some
commentators saw it as an overreach that favored copyright owners
over freedom of expression, stating, for example, "The takedowns
resulting from DMCA notifications ... are imposed to limit speech
before any adjudication on the merits of the copyright claims."'19 The
idea that a law could so easily be used to shut down commentary and
criticism without any judicial oversight is what concerns these DMCA
critics.
At the advent of the DMCA, some alarmists said that
enforcement of the DMCA would mean the end of free speech on the

15.
Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright's Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects
of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171, 175 (2010).
16.
See,
e.g.,
Statement
of
Rights
and
Responsibilities,
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms ("Ve can remove any content or information you post.");
Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/terms [https://perma.cc/QCA3-8FVX]
("YouTube reserves the right to remove Content without prior notice" and 'YouTube may at any
time, without prior notice and in its sole discretion, remove such Content... in violation of these
Terms of Service."); Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com/478745558852511
[https://perma.cc/D54A-QHJF ("Instagram reserves the right to remove any Content from the
Service for any reason, without prior notice."); see also Lydia Pallas Loren, DeterringAbuse of the
Copyright Takedown Regime by Taking MisrepresentationClaims Seriously, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 745, 773 (2011).
17.
See Derek J. Schaffner, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Overextension
of Copyright Protection and the Unintended Chilling Effects on Fair Use, Free Speech, and
Innovation, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL. 145, 147 (2004). The ease of writing a short DMCA
notice and takedown letter is evidenced at Example DMCA Notice of Copyright Infringement
Letter,

FUTUREQUEST,

http://www.futurequest.net/Services/TOSDMCA/DMCANotice.php

[https://perma.cc3AEG-RDY9].
18.
See Bridy, supra note 9, at 697 (discussing that the DMCA is able to remain
relevant with Internet growth in some aspects, but its failures require alternatives or
amendment to meet the changing online world); see also Robins, supra note 9.
19.
Seltzer, supra note 15, at 190 (2010).
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Internet. 20 Some continue to do so. 21 Amici curiae in the Lenz case
noted that Google, Twitter, and other OSPs receive hundreds of
unfounded takedown claims per day and illustrated the harsh realities
of what they consider to be the DMCA's ineffective system. 22 Before
the Lenz decision, copyright owners were "free to send a takedown
notice for cases of questionable infringement, de minimis
infringement, or in clear cases of fair use. ''23 Pre-Lenz, consequences

for copyright owners were largely nonexistent.
A. Legitimacy and Number of Takedown Notices
Despite the existence of some outlier cases, the majority of
DMCA notices appear legitimate. Improper reports are often caught
before the content provider initiates the takedown. 24 One study
reports that Google's notices increased by 304 percent from 2010 to
2011 and reached more than sixty thousand notices each month in
2012.25

Each notice may include between one and ten thousand

takedown requests. 26 "Pundits point to the high takedown rates
achieved by reporters, assert that takedown notices are highly
'' 27
accurate, and conclude that most takedowns are legitimate.
Nevertheless, when the takedown notices are not legitimate, users
often fear lawsuits or are merely ignorant about how to respond, thus
28
complying anyway.
B. DMCA Abuse
Though most DMCA notices may be legitimate, no reasonable
person could say that the process is not subject to abuse. However,
some "abuse"-or misuse-is at least understandable. While the
DMCA provides robust protection for copyright infringement, it
20.

See generally Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital

Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability,62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487 (2005).

21.
See e.g., Lenz v. Universal, Brief of Amici Curiae Automattic Inc. et al., No.
13-16106, 6-14 (Dec. 13, 2013) (hereinafter Automattic Brief); Lital Helman & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Best Available Technology Standard, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1194, 1209 (2011) ("An
additional concern emanating from the present regime, which places enforcement in the hands of
copyright owners, is that too much speech will be curtailed.").
22.
See Automattic Brief, supra note 21.
23.
See Charles W. Hazelwood, Fair Use and the Takedown/Put Back Provisions of the
DigitalMillennium Copyright Act, 50 IDEA 307, 307 (2010).
24.
See Automattic Brief, supra note 21.
25.
Daniel Seng, The State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical Analysis of DMCA
Takedown Notices, 18 VA. J.L & TECH. 369, 390 (2014).
26.
Id. at 408.
27.
Id. at 430.
28.
Id.
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provides little to no protection for other forms of intellectual property,
privacy, or anything other than copyrights. Where copyright seems
elevated above all other rights, this privileged position provides a
powerful incentive to utilize its remedy beyond its boundaries.
"A number of notices .

.

. appear to include claims in addition

to, or instead of, copyright infringement-such as unfair competition,
trademark-type claims, or privacy concerns. ' 29 An accounting of
improper DMCA notices found that 55 percent of improper Google
search takedown notices were related to claims of unfair competition. 30
Meanwhile, 21 percent of the takedown notices targeted "hobbyists,
critics, and educational users," whose use we would typically classify
as fair use.31 Moreover, "[a] total of 37 [out of 876] notices include[d]

claims for noncopyrightable subject matter."32 Notices also included
flaws like questions of ownership, fair use, descriptions of products,
and claims of infringement upon a "look-and-feel" claim. 33 On the
darkest side of the DMCA, would-be censors improperly use the
procedure to attempt an end-run around the prohibition on prior
restraints in defamation actions. 34 These alternative DMCA uses can
be fairly characterized as being counter to freedom of expression
35
interests.
DMCA notices may also be used as a cheap form of prior
restraint. In Automattic Inc. v. Steiner,36 an organization attempted
to use the DMCA to remove criticism with no underlying claim
29.
Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling Effects"?
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006).
30.
Id. at 651. Note that it is difficult to accurately record data on DMCA notices,
because it involves private parties and procedures with no main recording source. Id.
31.
Id. at 655.
32.
Id. at 668.
33.
Id.
34.
As a few examples: In 2007, Powermark Homes issued a takedown against the
owners of Powermarkhomessuck.com, a site formerly used to criticize the Ohio homebuilding
company that now sells products, which is confusing. Powermark Homes Inc. v. John Doe,
Complaint, No. CV-07-625465 at Exhibit A (D. Ohio May 25, 2007); POWERMARK HOMES SUCKS,
Powermarkhomessucks.com [https://perma.cc/REF3-X5S6]. In a 2008 complaint, Brave New
Films asserted claims against Michael Savage, a talk radio host, for improperly using the Section
512 takedown procedures to remove a video that criticized Savage's anti-Muslim "tirade."
Compl., Brave New Films 501(C)(4) v. Weiner, 626 F.Supp.2d 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No.
3:2008-cv-04703). Also, in 2014, the Law Offices of Bornstein and Bornstein sent a DMCA
takedown request to YouTube to remove a video of an anti-eviction protest occurring outside of
their Eviction Boot Camp seminar. Chris Roberts, SF Eviction Attorneys Use Copyright Law to
Get
Protest
Removed,
NBC
BAY
AREA
(July
21,
2014),
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local[Noted SF- Eviction-Attorneys-Use-Copyright-Law-To GetProtest-Removed-268036501.html [https://perma.cc/B6QA-W8JE]. For more details on DMCA
takedowns, see Seng, supra note 25.
35.
Urban & Quilter, supra note 29, at 668.
36.
82 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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whatsoever.
In that case, a blogger, Oliver Hotham, contacted
Straight Pride UK and inquired about its stance on gay rights.
Hotham subsequently posted articles about the interview on his
WordPress blog, revealing Straight Pride's homophobic views. In
response, Straight Pride UK issued multiple takedown notices for any
post concerning that interview. Automattic operates the WordPress
blogging platform and brought a claim, along with Hotham, under
Section 512(f) 37 to thwart Straight Pride's inappropriate DMCA use
and claim damages for lost time, resources, and interference with
Hotham's free speech rights. 38 The Section 512(f) claim succeeded
when Straight Pride defaulted, but it likely would have prevailed even
on a contested claim, as there was no copyright infringement because
the takedown notice did not identify any copyrightable subject
39
matter.
Another example of DMCA abusive use is Tuteur v.
Crosley-Corcoran.40
In 2012, Amy Tuteur, an obstetrician
gynecologist, posted multiple articles on her blog questioning "the
merits of home births," including one specifically about the safety of
Gina Crosley-Corcoran's home birth practice. 41 Crosley-Corcoran
responded with a post aimed at Tuteur and an image of
Crosley-Corcoran extending her middle finger. 42 The Section 512(f)
claim came after Crosley-Corcoran sent Tuteur a takedown notice for
reposting the photograph on Tuteur's blog. In the most recent
decision in the case, the District Court of Massachusetts held that the
takedown notice complied with DMCA requirements, 43 thus showing
that the DMCA can be used as a tool in disputes that are largely not
copyright infringement cases. However, in this case, since there was
at least marginally a copyright claim, use of the DMCA is proper.

37.
Automattic argued it had suffered damages in the form of employee time responding
to notices and media inquiries and harm to its reputation when it removed the non-infringing
content. The court awarded Automattic damages for employee time expense only. See Steiner, 82
F. Supp. 3d at 1030-31. In light of Automattic's arguments, one may assume they joined in the
case for reputational purpose, in hopes of gaining some extra notoriety, or to make a statement
to copyright owners.
38.
See Steiner, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1019.
39.
See id.
40.
Tuteur v. Crosley- Corcoran, 961 F. Supp. 2d 333 (D. Mass. 2013).
41.

See Compl.

11-19, Tuteur, 961 F. Supp. 2d, (No. 1:13-cv-10159-MBB).

42.
Id. 19-25.
43.
See Tuteur, 961 F.Supp.2d at 333. Note that in this case, at least one of Corcoran's
attorneys did consider fair use. Id. at 342.
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C. Simply Erroneous DMCA Takedowns
Hanlon's Razor commands that we not attribute to malice that
which can be adequately explained by stupidity or incompetence. 44
The DMCA seems to have dumped a pile of blades from Hanlon's
Razor across the country. Further, a significant number of takedowns
are not even that culpable, but often the result of mere clumsiness.
For instance, in 2003, the simple combination of "Usher" and
".mp3" triggered a takedown notice for a song posted online,
performed by Pennsylvania State University staff member Peter
Usher-not the popular recording artist, Usher Raymond. 45 The song
was, in fact, about a gamma ray satellite designed by the school and
had no relationship at all to the recording artist. 46 Indeed, the
Recording Industry Association of America, which issued the notice,
"confirmed that its policy does not require its Internet copyright
enforcers to listen to the complete song. '47 Certainly no one meant
any harm in issuing the takedown notice, but it resulted in a
takedown, nonetheless.
More recently, Harvard Professor Lawrence Lessig brought a
claim against Liberation Music ("Liberation") over a DMCA takedown
notice for a lecture posted on YouTube. 48 Lessig's lecture, about
culture and the Internet, included video clips from the "Lisztomania
copycat video phenomenon" to illustrate tools used in Internet
communication. 49 In response to his counter-notice, Liberation sent
an email directly to Lessig threatening suit if he failed to retract the
counter-notice within seventy-two hours. 50 When Lessig responded by
filing for declaratory judgment and damages under Section 512(f),
44.
See, e.g., Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Bos. v. Devillalvilla, No. 6:12-cv-1320-Orl 37TBS, 2014 WL 309084, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2013) ("Wielding Hanlon's Razor, the Court
declines to infer malice from conduct that can be adequately attributed to incompetence.").
45.
The Artist, USHERWORLD, http://usherworld.com/the-artist/ [https://perma.ccfB992M5DR].
46.
Seltzer, supra note 15, at 210.
47.
Declan McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for Threatening Letter, CNET NEWS (May 12,
2003, 6:12 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/riaa-apologizes-for-threatening-letter/ [https://perma.
cc/N738-E9WU].
48.
See Compl., Lessig v. Liberation Music Pty Ltd., No. 1:13-cv-12028 (D. Mass. Aug
22, 2013) (hereinafter Lessig Complaint).
49.
Id. at 4. A video featuring "Lisztomania" by the band Phoenix mashed up dance
scenes from different 1980s movies including The Breakfast Club and Pretty in Pink. After the
YouTube video was subject to a DMCA takedown, fans from around the world re-created the
scenes and posted their own versions. You can see a compilation of them at ReVid, Lisztomania
Brat Pack Mash Up Compilation ReVid . . . and It Continues, YOUTUBE (Sep. 19, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=reyJfePlbDA [https://perma.cc/7T6ZBQ38]. A repost of the
original can be found at Avoidantconsumer3, phoenix-lisztomania-brat pack remix (original),
YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-Y1LKG-8sHF [https://perma.ccN8EA-N59V].
50.
See Lessig Compl., supra note 48, at 8.
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Liberation immediately settled for an undisclosed amount. 51
Liberation blamed the actions on an untrained employee, who failed to
watch the video before issuing the notice. 52 What these clumsy or
incompetent errors tell us is that if there is likely little consequence
for negligent use of the DMCA, there is little incentive to wield its
power with care.
D. Problems Facing Copyright Owners
These examples show how DMCA takedown notices can be
tools of censorship-intentional or unintentional. But it is not just
users who have found that the DMCA is a poor fit for today's reality.
The DMCA was written for an Internet with dial-up speeds that made
widespread online piracy a technological impracticality. 53 Copyright
owners who were initially pleased with the DMCA have found that the
proliferation of online piracy at broadband speeds leaves them playing
"Whack-a-Mole."5 4 They often send hundreds of thousands of notices,

just to find that the content wind up online again seconds later. 55 The
"digital movement has turned everybody into potential distributors
and, in the eyes of copyright holders, into potentially dangerous
copyright infringers. ' '56 But, ultimately, it leaves authors and artists

51.
Stipulation of Dismissal, Lessig v. Liberation Music Pty Ltd., No. 1:13-cv-12028 (D.
Mass. Feb. 28, 2014); Mike Masnick, Label Threatening Larry Lessig With Insane Infringement
Claim Over Fair Use Video Caves In, Pays Up, TECHDIRT (Feb. 28, 2014),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140227/15302526383/label-threatening-larry-lessig-withinsane-infringement-claim-over-fair- use -video-caves-pays -up.shtml
[https://perma.ccPZ95SP85].
52.
See id.
53.
The DMCA went into effect in October 1998. A high-end Internet user enjoyed a
connection speed of around 100 Kbps (Kilobits per second) at this time. See Jakob Nielsen,
Nielsen's Law of Internet Bandwidth, NIELSEN NORMAN GRP. (April 5, 1998),
https://www.nngroup.com/articles/law-of-bandwidth!
[https://perma.ccfV9PT-G7EQ].
Similar
users in 2014 enjoyed a connection speed over one thousand times higher than this. See id.
54.
Appellant's Br. at 55, UMG Recordings v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d
1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 09-56777) ("Veoh's site, like others' is dynamic and changes day-to-day
or hour-to-hour as users upload more material, the task of identifying and sending notifications
requesting the removal of copyrighted works would amount to an unending version of the
children's game of'Whack-A-Mole"'); see also Automattic Inc. v. Steiner, 82 F.Supp.3d 1011, 1019
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (showing that even though the content was eventually found non-infringing
during the dispute, plaintiff replaced the content multiple times on multiple platforms); Kevin C.
Hormann, The Death of the DMCA? How Viacom v. You Tube May Define the Future of Digital
Content, 46 HoUs. L. REV. 1345 (2009) (discussing OSP liability in user reposting of infringing
content).
55.
Appellant's Br., supra note 54; see also Steiner., 82 F.Supp.3d at 1019; Hormann,
supra note 54.
56.
Michael P. Murtagh, The FCC, the DMCA, and Why Takedown Notices are Not
Enough, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 233 (2009).

2016]

REFORM SECTION 512(F) OF THE DMCA & FAIR USE

753

overwhelmed, as the DMCA places a burden upon them to police
countless infringements.
Owners looked to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) for help,
but ISPs are reluctant to get involved, either out of an inability or an
unwillingness to do so. 57 For instance, after reviewing Comcast's
policies regarding peer-to-peer sharing websites, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) concluded that providers, such as
Comcast, may not arbitrarily discriminate against peer-to-peer
websites that frequently produce infringing content. 58 Essentially,
when a provider blocks all peer-to-peer sharing, its prohibition also
scoops up non-infringing content, thus chilling expression. 59 When
"Americans... refuse to follow traditional copyright law" 60 and ISPs
do not have much leeway to help, copyright owners find it necessary to
issue floods of takedown notices.
On the other hand, at least one author has argued that "ISPs
should not be liable for copyright infringement in the first place"; that
author believes ISPs are not the problem-the problem remains with
Section 512.61 "Section 512 ignores [that ISPs should not be liable] in
the interests of helping copyright owners protect their rights, but it
provides an insufficient check on overreaching, and creates an
unacceptable shortcut around the procedures that are needed to
decide whether speech is actually infringing. ' 62
Furthermore,
copyright infringement is often unclear, and ISPs are not always
equipped to adjudicate fact-specific cases that even courts sometimes
have trouble deciding.
There is room for debate as to whether ISPs or the law are to
blame, but a recent case seems to illustrate that some ISPs have an
incentive to promote piracy.6 3 For example, large-scale "conduit" ISPs
have a perverse financial incentive to impede copyright enforcement
or to at least turn a blind eye. 17 U.S.C. Section 512(i) requires ISPs
to create and reasonably implement a repeat infringer policy by which
the ISP will terminate access to services for repeat copyright
57.
Trimble & Mehra, supra note 9, at 687 ("ISP satisfaction with the [DMCA] might
also suggest that the law does not adequately incentivize ISPs to innovate in particular aspects
of technology, and in the worst case scenario, the law could actually incentivize ISPs to slow
their innovation in technology.").
58.
Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp., 23 FCC
Rcd 13028, 6 (2008) (memorandum opinion & order).
59.
Murtagh, supra note 56, at 238.
60.
Id. at 244.
61.
MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, NYU BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WILL FAIR
USE SURVIVE?: FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL 5 (2005).

62.
Id.
63.
BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 2015 WL 7756130 (E.D. Va.
Dec. 1, 2015).
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infringers. The DMCA thus requires conduit ISPs-which profit by
having as many paying subscribers as possible-to comply with the
statute by cutting into their own profits.
This is precisely what caused the dispute in BMG Rights
Management (US) LLC v. Cox Communications, Inc. 64
Cox
Communications ("Cox") nominally had a repeat infringer policy but
for years did not actually apply it, instead allowing repeat infringers
to reactivate their accounts with Cox as soon as they were
terminated. 65 The District Court of Eastern District of Virginia found
that this practice amounted to Cox deliberately flouting the purpose of
the DMCA. 66 Even when Cox did implement an actual repeat
infringer policy, it did so in such a lukewarm manner that it once
again violated the DMCA by not terminating access of repeat
infringers under appropriate
circumstances
and using an
unreasonable "hard limit" on the number of infringement notices it
would receive in a twenty-four-hour period. 67 Discovery revealed that
the main reason Cox was so unwilling to comply with the DMCA was
because it did not want to lose the monthly subscription fees from
users they should have terminated.6 8 This strategy did not play out
well for Cox; a jury entered a $25 million damages award against the
ISP for contributory copyright infringement. 69 However, this result
does not seem to signal a trend, as BMG Rights Management is
distinct from the many cases in which courts do not find that ISPs are
to blame for copyright infringement.
With ISPs largely short on incentives to be helpful and
copyright owners vastly outnumbered by infringers, the war of
attrition seems to be one that copyright owners cannot win under the
current legal regime. Accordingly, it is not surprising that copyright
owners might be overly zealous or clumsy with their persistent game
of "Whack-A-Mole" with infringers. Unfortunately, this state of affairs
seems to leave fair use as collateral damage.
E. Counter-Notifications-TheDMCA's Safety Valve?
Despite the perceived imbalances of power in the DMCA
regime, there are safety nets for users subjected to DMCA takedowns.
64.
See id.
65.
See id. at *48-49.
66.
See id. at *48-57.
67.
See id. at *46.
68.
See id.
69.
Jimmy Hoover, Cox Must Pay BMG $25M For User Piracy, Jury Finds, LAW 360
(Dec. 17, 2015, 12:38 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/739353/cox-must-pay-bmg-25m-foruser-piracy-jury-finds [https://perma.ccY553-PK8E].
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The DMCA permits users to submit counter-notices to content
providers and encourage them to re-upload the content. 70 Critics of
the DMCA emphasize that, even with counter-notification, the "DMCA
requires the service provider to keep the material offline for more than
a week"-thus effectively quelling non-infringing speech.7 The
counter-notice process requires a speaker to affirmatively "reassert
the lawfulness of his speech" in order to counter-act its suppression,
72
even before any court determination that it should be suppressed.
While courts claim that fair use and the "idea/expression dichotomy"
adequately accommodate speech in the copyright context, 73 this is
commonly used to "explain away First Amendment concerns," rather
than address them. 74 Thus, fair use certainly provides little comfort
under the DMCA.
Additionally, some OSPs make their counter-notice process
virtually useless. 75 Some websites have programs outside of Section
512 to determine infringement, often including a three-strikes or
"graduated response" action whereby users' accounts can be
suspended or terminated with minimal notice. 76
To issue a
counter-notice, a user must reveal her identity and consent to a
77
jurisdiction wherein she may be sued for copyright infringement.
Considering the average YouTube user's degree of legal knowledge
and financial ability to afford representation, the possibility of a
lawsuit is an understandable fear. 78 Furthermore, when a user
succumbs to the disincentives built into the DMCA process, such as
the effort required to file a counter-notification or the mere desire to
fully avoid any legal entanglements, the marketplace of ideas can find
its wares subject to intellectual confiscation without any real due
process.
The response to this argument, however, is that a
counter-notification requires very little effort, and thus complaints
about it as a disincentive are perhaps overblown.
Nevertheless, some might argue that once one expresses
oneself, any requirement of effort to keep that expression online is an
infringement upon the speaker's rights.
A counter-notification

70.
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g); Lessig Complaint, supra note 48, and accompanying
discussion.
71.
Seltzer, supra note 15, at 176.
72.
Id. at 177.
73.
Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 1270 (2012) (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186
(2003)); see also Seltzer, supra note 15, at 187.
74.
Seltzer, supra note 15, at 187.
75.
Pallas Loren, supra note 16, at 752.
76.
Id. at 780.
77.
Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3)(D) (2012).
78.
See Hazelwood, supra note 23, at 330.
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requires all but thirty seconds worth of work-which is hardly too
laborious. Although, this perspective may be simply a matter of a
generational divide. After all, cereal sales are crashing, because
cereal is considered to be too much work for millennials.79 Expecting
them to fill out a counter-notification template form may truly be
asking way too much.
III. FAIR USE
American copyright law rests on the "incentive theory, 8 0° under
which copyright owners are incentivized to create new works due to
gaining a temporary monopoly over using their works for commercial
purposes. These owners create music, movies, books, and other
creative works.8 1 This framework is intended to benefit everyone,
because those works expand learning and the arts and ultimately fall
into the public domain so that they can be used for further creative
and beneficial use.
Fair use is an exception to the copyright monopoly, designed to
82
further the utilitarian objective underlying the incentive theory.
Without fair use, copyright would block the creation of new creative
endeavors that build on old ones by utilizing some parts of copyrighted
works. For example, if someone wants to review a movie, she may
need a short clip from the film.8 3 Or, if one wants to criticize a book,
she might not be able to do that without quoting that book. Parodies,
compilations, news reports, and educational uses all depend on fair
use.

79.
Roberto Ferdman, The Baffling Reason Many Millennials Don't Eat Cereal, WASH.
POST (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.comnews/wonk/wp/2016/02/23/this-is-theheight-of-laziness/ [https://perma.cc/XE94-3ZTS].
80.
See Ronak Patel, First World Problems: A Fair Use Analysis of Internet Memes, 20
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 235, 241 (2013) (discussing the market failure theory of fair use).
81.
See Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-To-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 951 (2004).

82.
See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Reconstructingthe Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1659, 1671 (1988); Ryan T. Holte, Restricting Fair Use to Save the News: A Proposed
Change in Copyright Law to Bring More Profit to News Reporting, 13 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
No. 1, 32-34 (2008); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market FailureApproach to Fair Use in
an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 38-39 (1997); Matthew Sag,

God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 393-94 (2005).

83.
Copyright owners have been known to haphazardly attack their own legitimate
trailer websites; think of the trouble for users posting a clip of the film. See, e.g., Chris Morran,
Universal Studios Copyright Bot Stupidly Asks Google to Delist IMDB Page for "Furious 7,"
CONSUMERIST (July 22, 2015), https://consumerist.com/2015/07/22/universal-studios-copyrightbot-stupidly-asks-google-to-delist-imdb-page-for-furious-7/
[https://perma.cc/G5SF-MEXF]; see
also Tara M. Warrington, Harry Potter and the Doctrine of Fair Use: Conjuring a New Copyright
Complaint, 10 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 622, 625.
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Although the DMCA is intended to protect copyright and
perhaps regards some free speech as collateral damage in the
protection process, it has especially poor eyesight when it comes to fair
use-the universal right to use someone else's copyrighted works, with
or without permission, as long as the users are creating a
"transformative" work in the process.84
A. A History and Development of Fair Use
Fair use is not a new construct. The legal basis of the US fair
use framework presently comes from Section 107 of the Copyright Act,
and it is rooted in the First Amendment.8 5 However, it has a much
longer tradition than its statutory, or even constitutional
underpinnings. Indeed, early cases under the Statute of Anne8 6 in the
1700s held that some uses of others' works did not constitute unlawful
acts.8 7 Long before First Amendment jurisprudence began to develop,
Justice Story penned his opinion on "fair abridgement" in Folsom v.
Marsh.88 This is regarded as the beginning of the theory in American
89
jurisprudence.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) ("Although such
84.
transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.
Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within
the confines of copyright, and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.").
85.
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the FirstAmendment Skein,
54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21 (2001) ("Further undermining fair use's First Amendment potency, the
[Supreme] Court also defined the privilege as an 'affirmative defense,' ruling in effect that the
burden of proof is on the party claiming fair use." (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985))).
8 Ann. c. 21 (1709) (Eng.).
86.
87.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576 (citing WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE
IN COPYRIGHT LAW 6-17 (1985) and Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1105 (1990)).
88.
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). Although Justice Story's opinion in Folsom is
considered the first American expression on the doctrine of fair use, Justice Story raised many of
the same points two years earlier, in Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, No. 5728 (C.C.D. Mass.
1839), a case involving the scope of protection to be accorded compilations of public domain
materials. In Justice Story's dicta, he discussed the issues presented by bona fide abridgments:
[I]f large extracts are made . . . in a review, it might be a question, whether those
extracts were designed bona fide for the mere purpose of criticism, or were designed to
supersede the original work under the pretense of a review, by giving its substance in
a fugitive form. The same difficulty may arise in relation to an abridgment of an
original work. The question, in such a case, must be compounded of various
considerations; whether it be a bona fide abridgment, or only an evasion by the
omission of some unimportant parts; whether it will, in its present form, prejudice or
supersede the original work; whether it will be adapted to the same class of readers;
and many other considerations of the same sort ... In many cases, the question may
naturally turn upon the point, not so much of the quantity, as of the value of the
selected materials. As was significantly said on another occasion-"Non numerantur,
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Fair use began to take a stronger hold in the early 1900s,
beginning with Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon.9 0 In that case, the alleged
infringer used excerpts from an original work in a parody. 91 Without
the benefit of the term "fair use," the court rejected an application for
a preliminary injunction, holding that invoking the right to parody
was not an infringement of any rights under the Copyright Act.
For the majority of the twentieth century, fair use remained a
common law doctrine that was not codified until the 1976 Copyright
Act. 92 Unfortunately, even upon codification, the law of fair use
remains muddy at best, and the judiciary seems disinclined to clarify
93
it.
Fair use permits the use of copyrighted work if the work is used
"for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching... scholarship, or research" 94 and is evaluated on a
case-by-case basis.9 5 Four major factors considered today include:
(1) the type of use, (2) the nature of the work, (3) the portion of the
work used, and (4) the effects on the market for the work. 96 This test
has given us unpredictable results.9 7 In a study of fair use cases,
copyright expert David Nimmer found that there is "virtually no
correlation between the four-factor inquiry and the courts' ultimate
rulings."98 Instead, courts appear to make a decision on the matter
and manipulate the factors to fit that decision.9
Even in the absence of such judicial arbitrariness, there would
be a tension between "fair use" and copyright ownership. 100 Copyright
ponderantur." The quintessence of a work may be piratically extracted, so as to leave
a mere caput mortuum, by a selection of all the most important passages in a
comparatively moderate space.
10 F. Cas. At 1038-39.
89.
See Alan Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, in SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDY No. 14, 2 (Comm. Print 1960).

90.
See Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903).
91.
See id.
92.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
93.
See Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 716 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2013) (showing that at the
district court level, Judge Pro engaged in a deep analysis of fair use; however, the Ninth Circuit
vacated the decision, while upholding the result).
94.
17 U.S.C. § 107.
95.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
96.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4). Though these are not the only factors considered, each
type of fair use listed in the statute, criticism, comment, news, reporting, etc. "provide[s]
important indications by showing which activities receive protection." See Patel, supra note 80,
at 240.
97.
See Hein & Beckles, supra note 61, at 11 (citing David Nimmer, Fairestof Them All
and Other Fairy Tales ofFairUse, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 264, 280-82 (2000)).
98.
Id.
99
Id.
100.
Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1096 (2007) ("Even when
a creator is satisfied that a contemplated use is legally fair, many media gatekeepers, such as
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owners understandably want to control or profit from every aspect of
their works. This incentive leads to a creative chilling effect. For
example, fair use protects "parody," but not "satire." Where is the
line? The First Amendment requires that we have some fair use
provisions; otherwise, copyright acts too much like a tool of censorship
and strangles creativity and the marketplace of ideas. 10 1
B. A Right or an Affirmative Defense?
One major difficulty with fair use in the DMCA context is
whether fair use is a right or merely an affirmative defense. 10 2 At the
genesis of the fair use doctrine, copyright holders were required "to
'1 0 3
prove that a use was unfair to prevail on a claim of infringement."
Today, case law has transformed fair use "from a right of speech to an
excuse for infringement." 10 4 Also, courts that formerly presumed use
was non-infringing now require that fair use be clearly shown. 10 5 This
shift makes the fair use defense somewhat of a paper tiger. Mark
Lemley wrote, "Because fair use relies upon a vague, multi-factor test,
it is often impossible to know ex ante whether any particular use will
qualify as fair." 10 6 Similarly, Lawrence Lessig calls fair use "the right
to hire a lawyer." 10 7 This burden shift itself creates a strong
disincentive to asserting fair use rights.
Early fair use jurisprudence "implied that the user held a
presumptive right to use the copyrighted expression absent a showing
otherwise."10 8 For example, in Gray v. Russell, the defendant was
found liable for infringement where he published an "improved"
version of the plaintiffs book; however, Justice Story also surveyed

television broadcasters, film distributors, and book publishers, will not accept such fair use
determinations, nor will they rely on their own fair use analysis.")
101.
Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, The Juice, and Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced a
Parody, 45 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 546, 581-83 (1998). To illustrate, in Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P.
v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996), affd, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.
1997), the courts refused to engage in a parody analysis for a satire about the O.J. Simpson trial,
The Cat NOT in the Hat!. Ochoa, supra,at 585-99.
102.
See Tara M. Warrington, Harry Potter and the Doctrine of Fair Use: Conjuring a
New Copyright Complaint, 10 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 622, 624.
103.
Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 136
(2011).
Id. at 137.
104.
105.
Id. at 136-37.
106.
Mark Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 185, 185-86.
107.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LoCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004).
108.
Snow, supra note 103, at 144.

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 18:4:743

the possibilities of lawful use, 10 9 providing reasoning whose echoes
would be heard in 17 U.S.C. Section 107.110 Story noted that, in some
cases, the court must consider certain factors in determining whether
there was "piracy" at all-specifically the type of work, the audience,
and the quantity copied.1 11
Copyright scholar Richard DeWolf remarked in 1925 that fair
use was a defense to infringement, but he lacked legal support for the
assertion. 112
Somehow this interpretation-that "fair use is
technically an infringement of copyright"-gained traction in
copyright treatises after 1944.113 Essentially, this view of copyright is
based on the consent of the copyright owner to the "reasonable use" of
others. To the contrary, fair use had previously been characterized as
a privilege: "None of these rules of decision are inconsistent with the
privilege of a subsequent writer to make what is called a fair use of a
prior publication."'1 4 Even if fair use is interpreted as a lawful
infringement, this interpretation does not require that fair use always
be a defense after the fact.
Courts continued to ignore early fair use jurisprudence until
the 1955 Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System decision
became the first case to tip the scales by stating outright that fair use
is an affirmative defense. 115 Those litigants who would invoke its
11 6
privilege would bear the burden of proving their non-infringing use.
However, the language of the 1976 Copyright Act and the fair use
provision, Section 107, support the idea that fair use is meant to be a
right or privilege. 11 7 The US House Judiciary Committee has reported
that "any special statutory provision placing the burden of proving fair

109.
See Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728). The opinion
thoroughly discusses the possible circumstances where the use would be permissible. At times
throughout the opinion, the reader is unsure of the outcome because of the emphasis on
assumption of lawful use.
110.
Leval, supra note 87, at 1105 (1990).
111.
See Gray, 10 F. Cas. 1035.
112.
Snow, supra note 103, at 155 (citing RICHARD C. DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF
COPYRIGHT LAW 143 (1925) ('[F]air use' strictly speaking ... is a use technically forbidden by
the law, but allowed as reasonable and customary, on the theory that the author must have
foreseen it and tacitly consented to it.")).
113.
Snow, supra note 103, at 157.
114.
See Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
115.
131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955) ("[D]efendants set forth three affirmative
defenses. 1. That the use made by defendants of 'Gaslight' was a fair use.").
116.
Snow, supra note 103, at 160.
117.
Justice Stanley Birch has also expressed concern with the characterization of fair
use. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (lth Cir. 1996)
("Although the traditional approach is to view 'fair use' as an affirmative defense, [1] ... [am] of
the opinion that it is better viewed as a right granted by the Copyright Act of 1976.")
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use on one side or the other would be unfair and undesirable," 118 and
Section 107 specifically states that "fair use of a copyrighted work is
not an infringement of copyright." 119 But labeling fair use as an
affirmative defense places the burden on the defendant and causes
fair use to become an excuse to infringement, and thus is inconsistent

with both the Judiciary Committee report and Section 107.120

The

Supreme Court, though, ultimately appeared to slam the door shut for
that argument in Harper & Row PublishersInc. v. Nation Enterprises,
where the Court finally declared fair use to be an affirmative
121
defense.

Despite the burden shift, fair use is meant to adequately
consider both the interests of the copyright owner and the user of the
work. 122 Fair use is rooted in the First Amendment in the US
context.123 However, it is also an international concept. 124
For
example, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual

Property Rights (TRIPS) requires signatories to enforce copyrights
across borders, but it provides for limitations on copyright protection
under the "three-step test."1 25 Under the test, exceptions to exclusive
rights are proper in certain special cases, which do not conflict with a

118.
Snow, supra note 103, at 160 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 90-83 (1967)).
119.
H.R. REP. No. 90-83.
120.
In the legislative history of the 1992 amendment to the Copyright Act, the Judiciary
Committee pronounced that "fair use is an affirmative defense" and "the burden of proving fair
use is always on the party asserting the defense." H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 3, n.3 (1992).
121.
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
122.
See Pamela Samuelson, Possible Future of Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 815 (2015);
see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (upholding a balance of
interests in fair use analysis).
123.
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the FirstAmendment Skein,
54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21 (2001) ("Further undermining fair use's First Amendment potency, the
[Supreme] Court also defined the privilege as an 'affirmative defense,' ruling in effect that the
burden of proof is on the party claiming fair use." (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985))).
124.
Ruth Okediji, Toward an InternationalFair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 75, 77 (2000).
125.
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [WTO], Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299
[hereinafter
TRIPS],
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/t-agm3-e.htm
[https://perma.cc/AW4G-PU8F]; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, Sept. 9 1886, 1186 U.N.T.S. 3, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file-id=283693
[https://perma.cc/5FCV-BX9X]; WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No.
105-17,
36
I.L.M.
65,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?fle-id=295157
[https://perma.cc/375P-WFPX]; WIPO Performances and Phonograph Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file-id=295578
[https://perma.cc/NCJ8-BZPB].
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normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the right holder.126
The Berne Convention, through the TRIPS Agreement, 127
preserves certain fair use rights through the "three-step test." Per
article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, signatories are permitted to allow
use of copyrighted works "(1) in certain special cases, provided that (2)
such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work and (3) does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the author." 128 This test is intended to be flexible, allowing for
signatory states to provide for local custom and local differences in
enforcement.129
More recently, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
appears to give at least lukewarm support for fair use.1 30 A 2002
Canadian case 131 also fleshed out the great importance of fair use or
"fair dealing" limitations on the broad reach of copyright. Remarking
that the overprotected copyright can be just as harmful as
under-protected rights, the Court stated:
The proper balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not only in
recognizing the creator's rights but in giving due weight to their limited nature. In
crassly economic terms it would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists and authors

126.
TRIPS, supra note 125, at art. 13.
127.
The TRIPS Agreement requires member states to comply with sections 1-21 of the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. TRIPS, supra note 89.
Article 10(2) of Berne states:
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union, and for special
agreements existing or to be concluded between them, to permit the utilization, to the
extent justified by the purpose, of literary or artistic works by way of illustration in
publications, broadcasts or sound or visual recordings for teaching, provided such
utilization is compatible with fair practice.
Berne Convention, supra note 125, at art. 10(2).
128.
Berne Convention, supra note 89, at art. 9(2).
129.
See Christophe Geiger et al., Declaration: A Balanced Interpretation of the
Three-Step Test in Copyright Law, 1 J. INT'L PROP. INFO. TECH. & E-COMMERCE L. 119 (2010).
However, this Section 9(2) limitation was interpreted narrowly by a 2000 WTO Panel, which
held that any exception relying upon Sectopm 9(2) must "be limited in its field of application or
exceptional in its scope" and not "[cause or have] the potential to cause an unreasonable loss of
income to the copyright owner." Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright
Act, WTO Doc. WT/DS160/R (adopted June 15, 2000), at 6.109, 6.229.
130.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement [TPP]: Intellectual Property Rights
Chapter states:
Each Party shall endeavor to achieve an appropriate balance in its copyright and
related rights system, inter alia by means of limitations or exceptions that are
consistent with Article QQ.G.16, including those for the digital environment, giving
due consideration to legitimate purposes such as, but not limited to: criticism;
comment; news reporting; teaching, scholarship, research, and other similar purposes;
and facilitating access to published works for persons who are blind, visually
impaired, or otherwise print disabled.
Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. QQ.G.17 (Oct. 5, 2015), https://ustr.gov/tpp/.
131.
Thdberge v. Galerie d'Art du Petit Champlain Inc. [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336 (Can.).
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for the right of reproduction as it would be self-defeating to undercompensate them.
Once an authorized copy of a work is sold to a member of the public, it is generally for
the purchaser, not the author, to determine what happens to it. 132

Fair use is, at its core, a freedom of expression right that is
recognized globally and has grown up with copyright. It is where the
First Amendment and intellectual property form an inelegant
dovetail. Fair use has such pervasive acceptance that it even finds
protection in some international agreements that were signed entirely
to promote trade, with no free expression advocates at the table.133
Therefore, wielding the DMCA, which has both state-side and
international free expression consequences, should be done with care
rather than with allowances for recklessness. The Ninth Circuit has
correctly found that copyright owners should make a fair
consideration of their rights versus the protected rights (and maybe
even defenses) of the user before haphazardly issuing takedown
notices. 134 But, it does not go far enough in recognizing the right to
fair use.
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SECTION 512(F)
The DMCA "bite back" provision, otherwise known as Section
512(f), was intended to disincentivize sloppiness or censorious intent
in using the DMCA. However, this provision has largely failed.
Realizing that counter-notification under Section 512(g) is not
sufficient "where time-sensitive or controversial subjects are
involved," 13 5 Congress placed a price on unsupported infringement
claims. 136 Subsection 512(f) provides liability for bogus takedown
requests, including "any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees.
' 137
•. incurred by the alleged infringer . .. or by a service provider.
However, copyright owners and others have operated with relative
impunity, realizing that Section 512(f) lacked any teeth at all. 138
Post-Lenz, its teeth are still hardly venomous fangs.
The provision states:
(f)Misrepresentations.
this section-

132.
133.
MA 'HEW
134.
135.
136.

Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under

Id. 31.
The Imaginary Conflict Between Fair Use and International Copyright Law,
SAG (Feb. 27, 2013), http://matthewsag.coml/?p=370 [https://perma.cc/N5YS-5XNKI.
See discussion of the Ninth Circuit holding in Lenz, supra notes 2-8.
Pallas Loren, supra note 16, at 768 (quoting S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998)).
17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2014).

137.
Id.
138.
Jordan Koss, Note, Protecting Free Speech for Unequivocal Fair Users: Rethinking
Our Interpretationof the S 512(t) Misrepresentation Clause, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 149,
169 (2010).
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(1) that material or activity is infringing, or
(2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification,
shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the
alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by
a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service
provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the
material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or
139
ceasing to disable access to it.

Before Lenz, the Northern District of California set the
precedent for Section 512(f) cases in Online Policy Group v. Diebold,
Inc.,140 as this was the first time Section 512(f) had ever been enforced
in court. Diebold manufactured voting machines that were subject to
significant criticism.1 4 1 Student journalists found an email archive
where Diebold employees acknowledged problems with the
machines. 142 The journalists subsequently posted the archive online.
To attempt to contain its employee's statements, Diebold invoked the
DMCA despite the fact that there was clearly no copyright
infringement. 143
The plaintiffs argued that Diebold "knowingly materially
misrepresented" that publication of the email archive constituted
copyright infringement.14 4 The key dispute in the case was the
meaning of "knowingly materially misrepresented." The plaintiffs
sought to impose a standard similar to that required under a motion
for a preliminary injunction 14 5-that if Diebold lacked a likelihood of
success on the merits of a copyright infringement claim, it should not

139.
17 U.S.C. § 512(f).
140.
337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
141.
Id. at 1197. In 2003, the Election Assistance Commission was facing problems
implementing the Help America Vote Act meant to be under way by the 2004 elections. During
this incident, Diebold became the leading supplier of electronic voting machines to individual
states. Hackers accessed Diebold's system in March 2003 and leaked thousands of internal
emails discussing flaws in the Diebold system. Doris Estelle Long, Electronic Voting Rights and
the DMCA: Another Blast From the Digital Pirates or a Final Wake Up Call for Reform?, 23 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 533 (2006); see also Paul R. La Monica, The Trouble With EVoting, CNN MONEY (Aug. 30, 2004), http://money.cnn.com/2O04l08/3O/technology/election
diebold [https://perma.cc/L53T-V4NJ]; Melanie Warner, Machine Politics in the Digital Age, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/09/business/machine-politics-in-thedigital-age.html [https://perma.cc/S8UL-RF2S].
142.
Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1197.
143.
Id. at 1198.
144.
Id. at 1204.
145.
A preliminary injunction may be granted under the Copyright Act if a plaintiff
establishes: a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will succeed on the merits; a substantial threat
that denial of the injunction will result in irreparable harm to the plaintiff; threatened injury to
plaintiff outweighs any damage that injunction may cause opposing parties; and injunction will
not disserve the public interest. Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d
1458, 1462 (5th Cir. 1990).
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have sent a DMCA notice. 146 Diebold argued instead for a much
higher standard: in order to impose liability under Section 512(f), the
DMCA notice must be frivolous. 147 This threshold is similar to the
required standard to impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11.148
The court rejected both proposed standards, instead holding
that "knowingly" means that the party had actual knowledge of the
misrepresentation or that it should have known had it acted with
reasonable care or diligence. 149 Under this standard, Diebold still was
held liable, as it knowingly misused the DMCA procedure to remove
content that would not have been copyright protected.
The next major Section 512(f) case further weakened the
Section's deterrent effect. In Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of
America Inc., Michael Rossi ran a website that purported to provide
downloads of Hollywood movies, 150 which would clearly be infringing
conduct. 151 The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) sent a
number of DMCA takedown notices, knocking his website offline for a
period of time. However, "if MPAA had reasonably investigated the
website by attempting to download movies, it would have been
apparent that no movies could actually be downloaded from his
website or related links.1 52 Therefore, Rossi believed that the MPAA
could not have formed the requisite good faith belief that the website
actually had any infringing materials-since the very simple action of
trying to download the movies would have shown that not to be the
case.
The Ninth Circuit read Section 512(f)'s provision that a DMCA
takedown notice, to be considered improper, must
"knowingly
materially misrepresent . . .that material or activity is infringing" to
require subjective bad faith by the takedown notice's sender. 153
Rossi's own boasting about his full-length feature films caught him in

146.
Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1204.
147.
Id.
148.
FED. R. Civ.P. I1(b).
149.
337 F. Supp. 2d at 1204.
150.
391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).
151.
Compare Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America, Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir.
2004) with Columbia Picture Indus. v. Fung., 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that
isoHunt, a BitTorrent search engine used for third-party downloading, was not protected under
the DMCA "safe harbor" because it induced users to participate in illegal file sharing of music,
movies, and television shows) and Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F.Supp.2d 1303 (S.D.
Fla. 2013) (holding Hotfile, an online file storage service, vicariously liable for copyright
infringement where its users shared licensed material belonging to a number of well-known film
studios).
152.
Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1003.
153.
Id. at 1007.
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the trap of the DMCA. 154 Nonetheless, the court took the opportunity
to state, "A copyright owner cannot be liable simply because an
unknowing mistake is made, even if the copyright owners acted
unreasonably in making the mistake," and a subjective standard must
be used when discussing the good faith requirement, not the objective
"knowingly" standard. 155 While Rossi might not have been the most
sympathetic party, the decision eroded the deterrent effect of Section
512(f)-creating a safe zone for transmission of DMCA notices on this
subjective, rather than objective, good faith standard.
V. LENz V. UNIVERSAL AND THE "DANCING BABY" VIDEO

In Lenz v. Universal, the Ninth Circuit was confronted with the
aforementioned subjective-versus-objective question when it came to
the determination of whether the DMCA notice unfairly targeted fair
use. As noted above, Ms. Lenz posted a mere twenty-nine-second
156
video, with Prince's "Let's Go Crazy" playing in the background.
The video was not posted for commercial reasons; it did not use the
157
whole song; and, in fact, the song was, at times, barely audible.
Although fair use is sometimes difficult to ascertain because it
requires an exacting analysis at times, it hardly takes a fair use
expert to understand that this production was clearly fair use of the
song. Of course, it would have taken even less analysis to determine
that Mr. Rossi was not committing copyright infringement (the mere
click of a mouse would have shown that the movies in question could
not actually be downloaded from his website), so the question
presented to the court was whether Universal Music knew, or should
have known, that Lenz's use of the song was non-infringing fair use.
The key question in a Section 512(f) analysis is whether the
copyright owner can swear under 17 U.S.C. Section 512(c) that the
"use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by
the copyright owner, its agent, or the law."'158 By definition, the law
authorizes fair use-but should a copyright owner have to make a
preliminary fair use decision before sending out the notice? Upon
receiving word from YouTube that Universal Music Group's DMCA
notice led to her video being taken down by the website, Lenz sent
YouTube a DMCA counter-notification under Section 512(g) claiming
154.
Id. at 1002 ("A subsequent examination of Rossi's website revealed the following
contents: 'Join to download full length movies online now! new movies every month'; 'Full Length
Downloadable Movies'; and 'NOW DOWNLOADABLE."').
155.
Id. at 1005.
156.
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
157.
Id. at 1152.
158.
Id. at 1154; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
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that she had a right to post the video. 159 YouTube reposted the video
on its website about six weeks later. 160 Lenz then filed a claim under
the underutilized Section 512(f), arguing that Universal failed to meet
the requisite good-faith belief that the material in question is an
infringement of the copyright owner's rights. 161 Lenz did so with the
backing of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an advocacy
organization that was willing to litigate against a multibillion-dollar
company. 162
A. District Court Motion to Dismiss
As in the Rossi case, the two parties disagreed on the standard
that the court should apply. Universal moved to dismiss the Section
512(f) claim on the grounds that the company had no obligation to
consider fair use when sending a DMCA notice, because fair use is
only an affirmative defense. 163 At the trial court, Lenz defeated
Universal's motion to dismiss with a new interpretation-"An
allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a
takedown notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine
...is sufficient to state a misrepresentation claim pursuant to Section
512(f)." 164 The court took the position on Section 107 and Section
512(f) that "[e]ven if Universal is correct that fair use only excuses
infringement, the fact remains that fair use is a lawful use of a
16 5
copyright."
After rejecting the claim that taking the time to consider fair
use would heavily burden copyright holders, the Lenz court casually
mentioned in its Order Denying the Motion to Dismiss that copyright
holders must already consider the infringing nature of the use before
sending a takedown notice.16 6 But this is not often the case in
Copyright enforcers often use one employee, or even a
practice.
computer program, to determine whether the material merely

159.

Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152.

160.

Id.

161.

Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., F. Supp. 2d. 1150, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2008).

162.

Important Win for Fair Use in

'Dancing Baby' Lawsuit, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER

FOUND. (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.eff.org/press/releases/important-win-fair-use-dancing-babylawsuit [https://perma.ccYX85-373S].
Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
163.
164.

Id. at 1155.

165.
Id. at 1154 (emphasis in original).
Id. ('The DMCA already requires copyright owners to make an initial review of the
166.
potentially infringing material .. .[a] consideration of the applicability of the fair use doctrine
simply is part of that initial review.").
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contains a copyrighted work, 167 not necessarily whether that work is
actually infringing. This results in a dragnet that sweeps up a
significant amount of non-infringing expressive content-including
fair use.
One critic wrote that "[r]equiring copyright holders to engage
in a fair use analysis prior to issuing a takedown notice, pursuant to
17 U.S.C. Section 512, creates an improper burden on copyright
owners to discharge what would be an affirmative defense in a
potential infringement action. 1 68 Mareasa Fortunado claims that the
fair use analysis requirement would impose a "chilling effect" on
copyright holders for "fear of exposing themselves to liability."16 9 She
ultimately concluded that the Lenz decision is "inconsistent with and
subverts the structure and purpose of the DMCA."1 70 The Lenz
district court and the Ninth Circuit disagreed.
B. District Court Summary Judgment
The US District Court for the Northern District of California
handed down an order denying both Lenz and Universal's
cross-motions for summary judgment, which ultimately appeared to
take some of the teeth off of Section 512(f). At this stage, Lenz argued
for her fair use rights, but the parties additionally battled over
whether the Section 512(f) claim was appropriate in the absence of
substantial damages.
Lenz asserted losses under the theories that the takedown
interfered with her free speech, she lost time and resources pursuing
the lawsuit to defend her free speech rights, and legal action imposed
upon her attorneys' fees and costs. 1 71 Further, Lenz expressed clear
objections to the effects on her free expression, noting that she filmed
her children less frequently and sought at least nominal damages for
the restraint on her expression. 172 Universal argued, "YouTube

167.
Ed Oswald, Out of Control Copyright Bots Are Making a Mockery of the DMCA,
EXTREMETECH (Sept. 6, 2012, 10:37 AM), http://www.extremetech.com/internet/135529-out-ofcontrol-copyright-bots-are-making-a-mockery-of-the-dmca [https://perma.cc/9574-GG6N].
168.
Mareasa M. Fortunato, Let's Not Go Crazy: Why Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.
Undermines the Notice and Takedown Process of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 147, 150 (2009).

169.
Id.
170.
Id. at 167.
171.
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF, 2013 WL 271673, at 8 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 24, 2013).
172.
Id.
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services were available to Lenz at no cost and that Lenz did not care
that YouTube declined to host her video. 17 3
The court sided with Lenz and the Section 512(f) damages
language, holding that pre-suit attorneys' fees may be the basis for a
claim, but the loss of one's time amounts to, at best, a nominal
damage. 174 These are sufficient damages to assert a Section 512(f)
claim because requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate "those damages
were economic and substantial would vitiate the deterrent effect of the
statute." 175 This reasoning is consistent with the wording of Section
512(f), which provides for any and all damages. However, there would
have been no economic sense to Lenz's claim absent the provision in
Section 512(f) for the recovery of attorneys' fees.
Again addressing fair use, Lenz provided evidence that
Universal did not analyze fair use at all before filing its takedown
notice. One of Universal's employees reviewed all Prince-related
videos on YouTube and only examined whether a video "embodied a
Prince composition in some way if there was a significant use of it...
specifically if the song was recognizable, was in a significant portion of
the video or was the focus of the video. ' 176 Though the court upheld its
previous order that consideration of fair use is required, it explained
that "full-blown fair use analysis prior to sending a DMCA takedown
notice would be inconsistent with the remedial purposes of the
statute."1 77 Thus, so long as there is some "initial assessment" of fair
use, a copyright owner can still easily satisfy the Section 512(c)(5)
requirement of good faith. The cross-motions for summary judgment
on the issue were denied 178 because Lenz did not prove Universal
subjectively believed in a high probability of fair use, and Universal
did not prove it lacked such a belief.179 The case would need to be
tried to a jury to determine both the subjective bad faith of the
copyright owner 1 0 and for Lenz to receive any compensation.

173.
Id.; Klaus Decl. at Ex. 3, Lenz, No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF, 2013 WL 271673 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 24, 2013) (citing to an email, "I don't care that YouTube doesn't want to host it. Not like I'm
paying them.").
174.
Lenz, 2013 WL 271673, at 8-9.
175.
Id.at 9.
176.
Id.at 5.
177.

Id.

178.

Id. at 10.

179.
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-03783-JF, 2013 WL 271673, at 7 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 24, 2013).
180.
See Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America, Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir.
2004).
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C. The Ninth Circuit Ruling
In the interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Universal gave
the court a blanket opportunity to address whether fair use was
indeed merely an affirmative defense or could still be considered a
right or privilege.1 8 1 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with Universal,
holding, "Anyone who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer
of the copyright with respect to such use. 18 2 The court distinguished
between two types of affirmative defenses-those "labeled as such due
to the procedural posture of the case, and an affirmative defense that
excuses impermissible conduct." 18 3 The court thus held that even
though the Supreme Court and other precedent held fair use to be an
"affirmative defense," this designation does not remove the status of
fair use as a right.'84 Therefore, to prevail, Universal would have to
show that it appropriately considered fair use before taking DMCA
action. Although this holding would ostensibly seem to clarify things,
it actually muddies the waters even more.
In an unusual move, the Ninth Circuit issued an amended
opinion in Lenz, in which it made this fair use consideration
requirement even clearer.18 5 The court held that "fair use is...
distinct from affirmative defenses where a use infringes a copyright,
but there is no liability due to a valid excuse. 18s6 The court further
made it clear that "fair use is a unique situation in Copyright law, and
'18 7
it is thus treated differently from traditional affirmative defenses.
The court "conclude[d] that because 17 U.S.C. Section 107 created a
type of non-infringing use, fair use is 'authorized by the law' and a
copyright holder must consider the existence of fair use before sending
1 88
a takedown notification under Section 512(c).1
Accordingly, the long quest for an answer to the question as to
whether fair use is an affirmative defense or an actual right seems to
have been resolved, at least in the Ninth Circuit. This seems to have
adopted the view espoused by one scholar, Tara M. Warrington, who

181.
Compare Lenz v. Universal, 801 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2015) with Lawrence v.
Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61 (C.C.D. Mass 1869).
182.
Lenz, 801 F.3d at 1132-33 (internal citation omitted).
183.
Id. at 1132.
184.
Id. at 1133.
185.
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., Nos. 13-16106, 13-16107 U.S. App. LEXIS 5026 (9th
Cir. Mar. 17, 2016).
186.
Id. at *15.
187.
Id. at *16.
188.
Id.
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argued this point as far back as 2009 in the Florida Coastal Law
189
Review.
Under the Lenz decision, fair use is a right. However, when a
copyright owner uses the DMCA process, it acts almost like an
unreviewed preliminary injunction-the content comes down without
any determination of fair use-unless the online service provider is
willing to step into the fray and stick up for the uploader's rights, as
Automattic, operator of Wordpress.com, did in Automattic v. Steiner.
Therefore, the user's fair use right is only subject to the review process
at the copyright owner's end, and that review process need not be
correct-or even adequate. 190 The Ninth Circuit held that it was
satisfactory for the copyright owner to simply consider fair use, 191 no
matter how wrong the owner's determination might be. This analysis
is not weakened by the Lenz amended opinion from the Ninth Circuit,
in which the court made it clear that "this inquiry lies not in whether
a court would adjudge the video as a fair use, but whether Universal
formed a good faith belief that it was not. ' 192 Therefore, anyone who
abuses the DMCA may be pursued only under actual knowledge
theory, but not under willful blindness. 19 3 "[A] copyright holder need
only form a subjective good faith belief that the use is not
94
authorized."1
VI. REFORM SECTION 512(F) AND SECTION 107 IN LIGHT OF LENZ

As noted above, despite the fact that Congress codified fair use
in 17 U.S.C. Section 107, its four factors provide little clarity or
guidance.
David Nimmer studied the issue and came to the
unfortunate conclusion that judges largely pre-determine a result and
then force the facts into the factors.1 95 He found that "had Congress
legislated a dartboard rather than the particular four fair use factors
embodied in the Copyright Act, it appears that the upshot would be
the same ....

It is largely a fairy tale to think that the four factors

determine resolution of concrete fair use cases. 1

96

Further, Section

189.
See Tara M. Warrington, Harry Potter and the Doctrine of Fair Use: Conjuring a
New Copyright Complaint, 10 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 622, 622-625.
190.
See Lenz, 801 F.3d at 1134-36 (9th Cir. 2015). The court even discusses that fair use
may be appropriately be "considered" by automatic computer programs commonly utilized by
copyright enforcers. Id. at 1135.
191.
Id. at 1138.
192.
Lenz, Nos. 13-16106, 13-16107, at *16.
193.
Id.
194.
Id. at *17 (citing Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (90h Cir.
2004)).

195.
196.

Nimmer, supra note 97, at 280-82.
Id.
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512(f) is largely toothless-after all, Stephanie Lenz was only able to
197
bring her case because an advocacy organization took up the cause.

Changes to Section 512(f) could strengthen fair use by providing
stronger penalties for issuing DMCA notices in contravention of the
fair use right. Meanwhile, these penalties will likely increase the
number of people willing to litigate over transgressions against fair
use, providing a richer body of case law to rely upon.
A. Fair Use as a Right

With copyright law already acknowledging free expression as
an important right, the Lenz decision should stand as an example of
the need to also treat fair use as a right, rather than just a defense.
Treating fair use as merely an "affirmative defense" or "privilege"
makes Section 512 more of a prior restraint tool. 198 Furthermore, the

specific language of 17 U.S.C. Section 107 supports the idea that fair
use is more than just a mere privilege. 199
With the clear mandate from the Lenz amended opinion, there

should be little further argument on the point. Furthermore, when a
copyright claim is filed against an otherwise fair user, the fair user is
presented with the potential to recover attorney's fees if he wins. For
example, in Righthaven v. Hoehn,200 when a copyright plaintiff was

found to have filed suit over fair use, the copyright defendant received
20
not only summary judgment, but also an award of attorney's fees.

1

Although the attorney's fees order was not overturned, the fair use
decision was vacated on other grounds. 20 2 Ultimately, the only reason
Mr. Hoehn was able to fight for his rights was because the author,

197.
This proposition could further be generalized to conclude that Section 512(f) does
not practically protect individual actors who are not legally savvy.
198.
For the reader's information, the Supreme Court has roundly rejected prior
restraint. See Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 90-91 at n.7 (Tex. 2014) (citing THE BIG
LEBOWSK (PolyGram Filmed Entertainment & Working Title Films, 1998)). There is a "heavy
presumption" against prior restraints. See Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe,
402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). "Although prior
restraints are not unconstitutional per se, there is a heavy presumption against their
constitutional validity. This is because 'prior restraints on speech and publication are the most
serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights."' State ex rel. Toledo Blade
Co. v. Henry Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 926 N.E.2d 634, 639 (Ohio 2010) (citing FW/PBS, Inc.
v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225 (1990); Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 738 (2005)).
199.
"The fair use of a copyrighted work .. .for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, . . .scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2015).
200.
Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (D. Nev. 2011).
201.
Id.
202.
Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 716 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Hoehn's attorney, was willing to take his case on contingency. But,
more times than not, those who receive a takedown notice or those
who receive a copyright complaint must set aside their fair use and
First Amendment rights as a matter of pragmatism. This makes the
"right" of fair use illusory at best for the vast majority of market
participants.
Without the fair use exception to copyright, free speech would
be greatly inhibited.
Harper & Row Publishing v. Nation
Enterprises-the Supreme Court case labeling fair use as an
affirmative defense-asserted that "the Framers intended copyright
itself to be the engine of free expression. '20 3
The Court also
acknowledged the important ties between the First Amendment and
copyright law: "[C]opyright's idea/expression dichotomy strikes a
definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright
Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author's expression. 2 °4
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals more recently
held: "First Amendment privileges are [also] preserved through the
doctrine of fair use. Until codification of the fair-use doctrine in the
1976 Act, fair use was a judge-made right developed to preserve the
constitutionality of copyright legislation by protecting First
'20 5
Amendment values.
The fair use doctrine provides specific support for the stated
constitutional goals of the copyright clause. 20 6 Fair use supports the
principle that "access to information forms the basis for free speech
and participatory government" and denying access to information
would hinder society's ability to progress. 20 7
Therefore, the
interdependent nature of fair use and free speech makes strong fair
use protections necessary for a healthy First Amendment.
The DMCA takedown scheme virtually ensures censorship of
fair use before there is even adjudication as to whether the use is
actually fair. This takedown scheme has a chilling effect upon what
should be a constitutional-and even an international-right. One
way to shore up this right isto amend Section 107 to call for attorney's

203.
471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
204.
Id. at 556, 560 (citation omitted) (identifying a link between First Amendment value
and copyrightable expression permitting scholarship and commentary, but limiting the right of
first publication to copyright owners).
205.
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001).
206.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have power ... to Promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
207.
L. Ray Patterson & Stanley Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users'
Rights, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1624 (1991).
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fees for a prevailing fair user. The right would be further shored up
by amending Section 512 to specifically address issues of fair use and
free expression in its language. This action will deter the use of
DMCA takedown notices as prior restraints by placing a price tag on
their extrajudicial effects of removing stalls from the marketplace of
ideas.
B. Statutory Damages
First, Section 512(f) and Section 107 should be strengthened
with statutory damages provisions. After all, the Copyright Act
provides for statutory damages of between $200 and $150,000 for even
the slightest infringement of copyright. 208 The DMCA's legislative
history calls for consequences against those entities that abuse the
intellectual property rights of others. Indeed, "those who repeatedly
or flagrantly abuse their access to the Internet through disrespect for
the intellectual property rights of others should know that there is a
realistic threat of losing that access. ' 20 9 Why should there be no
similar disincentive to engage in extrajudicial prior restraint on fair
use? Why should we exalt the rights of a copyright owner so much
higher than the rights of a fair user, the rights of the marketplace of
ideas, and the rights of those who wish to truly advance the progress
of science and the useful arts?
The proposed statutory damages provisions for 17 U.S.C.
Section 107 and 17 U.S.C. Section 512(f) should use the same legal
DNA as 17 U.S.C. Section 504, wherein statutory damages are
reduced for certain good faith consideration resulting in an error in
judgment. However, they are increased for bad-faith restraint on fair
208.
For example, in 2012, Prenda Law was in the business of identifying IP addresses
that downloaded copyrighted pornography and filed suit against thousands of individuals and
received millions of dollars in damages. See Af Holdings LLC v. Does 1-135, No. 5:11-cv-03336
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2012); CP Prods. Inc. v. Gerald L Glover, No. 1:12-cv-00808-JMS, 2013 WL
7098626 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2013) (awarding Prenda affiliates the $150,000 maximum in
statutory damages for an individual who defaulted). Prenda Law acted as a "porno-trolling
collective"
by
monitoring
the
IP
addresses
downloading
their
copyrighted
pornography-sometimes made available by them-and sending cease-and-desist letter
demanding settlement. Many of these threats resulted in settlement granting Prenda attorneys
involved around $2 million. In a 2013 decision, California District Judge Wright scolded and
severely sanctioned Prenda Law for using their copyrights to "plunder the citizenry." Ingenuity
13 LLC v. John Doe, No. 2:12-cv-8333, 2013 WL 1898633 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2013). Though
Prenda was eventually punished for their actions, individuals may still be sued for minor
copyright infringements, such as a single BitTorrent download. Often in these cases individuals
do not know how to respond and end up paying the price for minimal infringement they
committed under statutory damages provisions. See also Achte v. Adrienne Neal, No. 1:10-cv00453-RMC (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2011) (granting full damages and fees upon default of individual who
failed to respond to copyright infringement complaint).
209.
H.R. REP. No. 105-551(11), at 61 (1998).
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use and free expression. The amounts could reflect the same or
similar sums up to $150,000 if a suit was filed or a takedown notice
was issued in bad faith. On the other hand, the amount could be
reduced to a minimum of $200 where the takedown notice was an
"innocent misrepresentation" or the fair use question in a lawsuit was
far from clear. This proposal would make the test an objective one,
replacing the current and inefficient subjective standard courts use to
evaluate whether a rights holder possessed a good faith belief. The
damage amounts should be both sufficient to deter weak copyright
claims when a fair user is a defendant and to further deter the
unfettered issuance of DMCA notices.
Damages would further
incentivize those affected by bogus DMCA takedowns to bring claims.
Additionally, just as copyright infringement comes with prevailing
party fees, so should Section 512(f) claims, and Section 107 should
make them mandatory. Why should copyright be so sacred that we
hold it above free expression? At the very least, let them both stand
on equal ground.
C. Copyright Cancellation
If she has not yet said it, Stephanie Lenz is certain to one day
tell her children "that's why we can't have nice things." Perhaps
copyright owners should be scolded as well if they use the "nice thing"
of their copyright registration in order to damage someone else's free
expression rights.
There should be additional penalties for bad-faith copyright
lawsuits or takedown notices restricting fair use or otherwise
protected speech. This would include cases such as Automattic v.
Steiner and Online Policy Group v. Diebold, where the takedown
notices were meant to silence lawful criticism. 2 10 In such cases,
copyright owners should face cancellation of their copyright
registration. 2 11 This suggestion may appear harsh to copyright owners
and enforcers, but it should only be implemented in cases where
takedown notices should absolutely not be issued-cases of clear
Section 512 "abuse"-and in cases where the copyright claim was
anemic from its inception in a lawsuit. Such a penalty would be
similar to the penalty provision in the Japan Trademark Law, Articles

210.
See Automattic Inc. v. Steiner, 82 F. Supp.3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also Online
Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
211.
See Joseph M. Miller, Fair Use Through the Lenz of § 512(c) of the DMCA: A
Preemptive Defense to a PrematureRemedy, 95 IOWAL. REV. 1697, 1726 (2010).
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51 and 53, where abuse of the mark that causes confusion
extinguishes that mark and prohibits re-registration for five years. 212
This Author does not suggest that the work should
immediately pass into the public domain. Instead, this Article merely
suggests that the registration should be cancelled, as a valid copyright
registration (or at least a pending application) is required to confer
standing on a copyright owner to file suit. 213 Thus, the copyright
owner would be kept out of federal court for a period of time. This
penalty would impact lawsuits, takedown tactics, and incentives by
making copyright owner's aware of the serious implemented
consequences of issuing bad-faith takedown notices.
D. Incentive for OSPs
A stronger damages provision in Section 512(f) could entice
OSPs to participate in Section 512(f) claims more frequently. As
discussed previously, they have little motivation to resist copyright
holders. OSPs act as middlemen, enjoying immunity by accepting
each party's notices and counter-notices, but they usually refrain from
being active participants in the tug of war. OSPs should be as
encouraged to bring Section 512(f) claims as users of their website,
especially because they usually have a greater capacity to do so. For

212.
See generally JAPAN PATENT ATTORNEYS ASsoCIATION, JPO TRADEMARK PRACTICE,
http://www.jpaa.or.jp/english/trademark/pdf/TRADEMARKPRACTICE.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
8B2W-CEFQ].
213.
In Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010), the Supreme Court
determined that federal courts have discretion to consider copyright cases where complete
copyright registration is not satisfied. Thus, some circuits require registration (or a denial
decision from the Copyright Office) for standing and others only require copyright application.
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits require that a work be actually registered. La Resolana
Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v.
Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990). The Fifth and Ninth Circuits permit
standing with only a submitted copyright application. Cosmetic Ideas Inc. v.
IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010); Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money
Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2004). Eighth Circuit precedent supports the application
approach. Action Tapes v. Mattson, 462 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006) (requiring the owner to have
paid an application fee for registration); see also Thomas M. Landrigan, Application or
Registration?: Confusion Regarding the Copyright Act's Prerequisite to Copyright Infringement
Lawsuits, 44 INDIANA L. REV. 581, 579-99 (2011) (discussing the Eighth Circuit approach). The
Third Circuit also appears to follow the application approach. Dawes-Lloyd v. Publish Am.,
LLLP, 441 F. App'x 956 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing court decisions using the registration approach but
finding that the application approach was adequate). The Seventh and Fourth Circuit cases have
not provided a definitive determination either way. The First Circuit has refused to make a final
decision on the matter. See Alicea v. Machete Music, 744 F.3d 773 (1st Cir. 2014) (refusing to
decide on an application or registration approach where summary judgment would have been
granted in either case). The Second Circuit has also not decided. A Star Group, LLC v. Manitoba
Hydro, 621 F.App'x. 681 (2d Cir. 2015); Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120 (2d
Cir. 2014).
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example, they often maintain internal legal departments and can
214
afford up-front legal expenses.
Lenz holds that the plaintiff need show only nominal damages
and such damages need not even be monetary. 215 The statute requires
amendment to promote OSP participation and address cases where
takedown notices are issued in bad faith, yet the OSP does not comply
with the takedown. Articulable and calculable monetary damages
should not be a prerequisite to a Section 512(f) claim, as the real
damage is in the suppression of a Constitutional right. The statutory
damages discussed above, in addition to attorneys' fees and costs,
should be available to OSPs as well as users.
E.

ProposedAmendments to Section 107 and Section 512

As previously mentioned, the most logical way to sharpen the
teeth of fair use and Section 512(f) is to amend the Section to include a
"material misrepresentation in bad faith" clause, as well as requiring
takedown notices under Section 512(c)(3) to include a statement of
reasonable fair use and protected speech consideration prior to issuing
the notice. To truly fulfill the promise of fair use as a right, Section
107 can be modified as well. The Author therefore proposes the
following amendments to Section 107 (additions in italics, deletions
stricken through):
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
research, is not an infringement of copyright.

of a copyrighted
or by any other
comment, news
scholarship, or

A. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.

214.
For example, YouTube's legal department can be easily contacted through its
"Contact Us" page, which also gives directions on how to submit copyright infringement notices
through
the
website. Contact Us, YOuTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/t/contact-us
[https://perma.c/8GY2-NWJQ].
215.
See supra part VI.B. and related discussion of damages; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(f0
(2015) ("any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by
any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is
injured by such misrepresentation").
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B. A defendant in a copyright infringement suit shall have the right to raise Fair Use in a
special motion to dismiss under this section,
(1) This motion may be filed at any time in the proceedings
(2) If a motion to dismiss is brought under this section, the court shall
a. Stay all other action in the case until the motion is resolved, unless there is a
clear showing:
i. of urgency or clear prejudice to eitherparty; or,
ii. of clearly articulated need for discovery with the precise discovery
required articulated by the party seeking it, and the court finds that the
case can not possibly be decided without the discovery
iii. that the plaintiff has posted a bond for the amount of fees expected to
be incurred in the discovery process, with this requirement to be waived if
there is a clear showing that it would subject the plaintiff to financial
hardship
b. Determine whether the defendant has established by a preponderanceof the
evidence that the use of the otherwise infringingmaterial constitutes "fairuse."
(3) If the court denies the motion, the defendant shall have an immediate right to an
interlocutory appeal.
(4) If the court finds that the motion was brought frivolously or vexatiously, the court
the moving party shall pay the non moving party's costs and attorney's fees incurred
in defending the frivolous or vexatious motion.
(5) If the court grants the motion, then the court shall issue an order:
a. Granting reasonablecosts and attorneys fees to the moving party; and,
b. Cancelling the copyright registration relied upon by the plaintiff in the
action;and,
c. Statutory damages,
i. which shall be the same amount of statutory damages sought by the
plaintiff in the complaint.
ii. If the plaintiff sought an indefinite amount of statutory damages, then
the amount awarded to the moving party shall be the maximum that
could have been sought by the plaintiff
iii. If the plaintiff sought only actual damages, then the damages granted
to the movant shall be no less than $10,000 but no greaterthan $100,000.
iv. In the event that the Court finds that the fair use question was novel,
or that the plaintiff could not likely have known that the defendant's use
was "fair use," then the Court may exercise its discretion to reduce the
amount of statutory damages to as little as $5,000.

The author further proposes the following amendments to
Section 512 (additions in italics, deletions stricken through):
17 U.S. Code § 512 - Limitation on Liability Relating to Material Online
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(c)(3) Elements of notification.(A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed infringement
must be a written communication provided to the designated agent of a service
provider that includes substantially the following:
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of
the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if
multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single
notification, a representative list of such works at that site.
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the
subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to
be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service
provider to locate the material.
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact
the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if
available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be
contacted.
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of
the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright
owner, its agent, or the law.
(vi) A statement that the complaining party has reasonably considered all
rights of the use of the material in the manner complained of, including, but
not limited to, the fair use of the material andprotected speech.
(vi).(vii) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and
under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on
behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.

(f) Misrepresentations.(1) Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section(A) that material or activity is infringing;e,-e
(B) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or
misidentification; or
(C) that material or activity is not lawful fair use or otherwise protected by the
First Amendment shall be liable for statutory damages sum of not less than
$750 or more than $30,000 per each item of material that is misrepresented to
be infringing. In a case where the court finds that such person did not
reasonably believe his or her act in issuing a notice under subsection (c) was
improper, the court, in its discretion, may reduce the award of statutory
damages to a sum of not less than $200. Such person shall be additionally
liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the
alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized
licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as
the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in
removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be
infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to
it.
(2) Any person who, in bad faith, materially misrepresents under this Section-
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(A) that the material or activity is infringing;or
(B) that the material or activity is not lawful fair use or otherwise protected by
the First Amendment shall be liable for statutory damages sum of not less than
$750 or more than $150,000, per each item of material that is misrepresented
to be infringing,as the court considersjust. Such person shall be additionally
liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the
alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized
licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentationas
the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in
removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be
infringingor in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to
it. In any case where such bad faith, material misrepresentation occurs,
registrationunder Section 410 of this chapter shall be canceled for a period of
no less than five years, and such person shall not cause the work or a
substantiallysimilar work to be registered during the cancellationperiod.

These modest changes to the statute will provide additional
cover for fair use and properly elevate it to the same importance as
infringement. After all, if mere misuse of a photograph, for example,
can subject the user to thousands of dollars in damages, even if they
are an innocent infringer, why not someone who unlawfully infringes
upon fair use? These changes would require a party to engage in a
serious evaluation of fair use before wielding the DMCA knife and
would incentivize a thorough analysis of the alleged infringer's rights.
This modest and incremental change would start moving us toward a
regime where fair use is a "right" not to be infringed lightly, rather
than a mere "right to hire a lawyer."
VII. CONCLUSION

Given the strong incentive for an OSP to remove content under
the DMCA, it is helpful to have a decision that breathes any
additional vigor into the protections of Section 512(f).
Lenz
acknowledges that a DMCA notice is a powerful tool and one must
demonstrate a modicum of responsibility before wielding its authority.
But how much responsibility will copyright holders really exercise?
Currently, even if a "moron in a hurry"2 16 would know that something
is fair use, all the DMCA issuer must be able to prove is that they
considered it, and plaintiffs in bogus claims often have little to fear.
Perhaps the best outcome from the Lenz case is for legislators,
users, and copyright holders to recognize the flaws in the DMCA and
push for an update to the DMCA that protects fair use and free
expression. This Article is not intended to suggest the DMCA could
not use more wholesale reform. Instead, this Article presents a rather
216.
Morning Star Cooperative Society v. Express Newspapers Ltd, [1978] F.S.R. 113
(UK) ('If one puts the two papers side by side I for myself would find that the two papers are so
different in every way that only a moron in a hurry would be misled.").

2016]

REFORM SECTION 512(F)OF THE DMCA & FAIR USE

781

limited suggestion to reform Section 512(f) and Section 107 for the
purpose of protecting free expression and fair use. The DMCA
requires other fixes to its other problems, including a possible remedy
for legitimate alternative uses and a way to prevent copyright owners
from playing "Whack-a-Mole" with large-scale infringement.
This Author leaves other minds to suggest how the DMCA's
other infirmities may be addressed. But this Article's suggested fixes
to the dull teeth currently in Section 107 and 17 U.S.C. Section 512(f)
would be a step toward protecting fair use and free expression from
DMCA abuse.

